This article focuses on Eurasianism as an ideological trend with a political appeal beyond the post-Soviet space. It demonstrates that the roles envisioned for the 'Trojan horses' of Eurasianism among the far right in Central/Southeast Europe and for Eurasianism's sympathizers in Western Europe bear a qualitative difference. In the former case, the emphasis is on systemic transformation whereas, in the latter case, on a gradualist strategy.
1) What are the ideological foundations and evolution of Eurasianism?
2) How is it possible to interpret the appeal of Eurasianism among political actors from the far right in Central and Southeast Europe?
Eurasianism: early beginnings
Alexander Dugin introduced the foundations of Eurasianism in the Principles of Geopolitics (1997) . In this book, the author advocates a foreign policy doctrine which is shaped by cultural essentialism and historical revisionism. Dugin's essentialism consists of dividing the world into geopolitical spheres of influence in accordance with 'established' historical and cultural attributes. Within this global context, the primary goal of Russian foreign policy must be to maximize its national interest within Eurasian space.
In accordance with the 'Karaganov doctrine', Dugin also contends that Russia must intervene to endorse the collective rights of ethnic Russians living in the 'near abroad'.
Nevertheless, there exists a basic difference between the 'Karaganov doctrine' and the concept of Eurasianism during its early stages. In the former case, Sergey Karaganov positions his thought within the context of Classical Realism and advocates ways for Russia to maximize its national interests inside the post-Soviet geopolitical environment (e.g. the case of the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia). On the other hand, although he assigns Russia a role of pivotal importance within the Eurasian project, Dugin does not endorse a strictly statist approach. By contrast, the thinker aspires to embed Eurasianism within a political infrastructure that goes beyond the role of states as the main actors in international politics (Shekhovtsov, 2008, p. 496) .
A dichotomy of fundamental importance is the one which consists of the Continental (mainly Russia) versus the Atlantic powers (i.e. the US and NATO). Russia's main global competitor is 'Atlanticism, the NATO/US imperium, and the liberal, as well as expansionist, principles that underpin US foreign policy' (Dugin, 1997 pp. 255, 259; Ingram, 2001 ).
Russia's main objective must be to utilize its resources in order to sustain a balance of power vis-à-vis its global rival and harness 'Atlanticism's incursions to the Eurasian heartland' (ibid). An early sign of Dugin's differentiation from the 'Karaganov doctrine' is his occasional choice of appeasement for tactical purposes. In this light, the author judges that the Baltic Republics, together with Central and Eastern Europe, may be 'conceded' to the Atlantic sphere of influence. 1 Dugin's outlook on global politics as a puzzle that consists of 'Russian/Eurasian', 'Atlantic/Western' and/or 'Arab/Islamic' spheres of influence, reads like a rehearsal of the pattern introduced in Samuel Huntingdon's Clash of Civilizations (1996) . It also reads like a 'reversal' of the pattern introduced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard (1998).
In an opposite outlook to Dugin's, Brzezinski views Russia as the main competitor to the US and recommends ways to counter Russian influence in international politics.
Concretizing Eurasianism: Towards a 'Fourth Political Theory'
Dugin's most recent work, Fourth Political Theory (2012), standardizes and enhances the political infrastructure within which the Eurasian project is embedded. In this work, Dugin wants to establish the foundations upon which a fourth ideology will emerge after Communism, Fascism, and Liberalism. The author subscribes to a vague notion of neotraditionalism and deplores the way that liberalism and postmodernity aspire to achieve universal homogeneity and lead towards an 'end of history'.
In the Fourth Political Theory and in quite a few of his recent statements, Dugin has concretized Eurasianism as a cultural sphere which, in his own words, is as distinct as the Islamic or the Buddhist world. According to the author, this has been the outcome of a historical process that has consisted of intercultural contacts and bonds of mutual reliance within a common geographic space. As a matter of fact, Dugin has been particularly careful not to conflate Eurasian identity with a 'Greater Russian' identity of any sort. By contrast, the author has opted to portray Eurasianism as a transnational and inclusionary mosaic within which smaller national identities can coexist harmoniously with the Russian one.
2 For Dugin, it is the cultural diversity, as well as idiosyncrasy, of Eurasia that renders its strict categorization into either the European or the Asian cultural zones highly problematic. The cases of Jobbik (Hungary), Golden Dawn (Greece), and Ataka (Bulgaria)
As Alexander Dugin has often acknowledged, he maintains close connections with the leaders of Jobbik (Gábor Vona), Ataka (Volen Siderov), and Golden Dawn (Nikolaos Michaloliakos).
The Russian thinker has held a series of cordial meetings with the Jobbik leader. He has also, allegedly, addressed a letter of support to the, currently imprisoned, leader of Golden Dawn.
Alexander Dugin has openly admitted that he regards such parties as a potential vanguard or 'fellow-travellers' in the European revolution against the Atlantic imperium. However, why the appeal of Eurasianism, in particular, to these parties? One might isolate the following factors in regards with these parties' appreciation for the Eurasian project.
the neotraditionalist/revisionist Counter-Currents blog on: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/01/manuelochsenreiter-interviews-alexander-dugin-on-the-ukraine-crisis/ (accessed on 01 June 2014).
7
On this issue, see Sahra Wagenknecht's (i.e. Die Linke's deputy-leader) statements on: http://www.thelocal.de/20140312/merkel-russia-has-stolen-crimea (accessed on 01 June 2014). 8 To this, one might also add the simultaneous endeavour by Russia Today and other Kremlin-sponsored networks to capitalize on, especially, 'lumpen Euroscepticism' within the EU. However, it is not my intention to discuss this issue in this short piece of work. 
Implications for the future
By contrast to the bipolarity of the '80s and the unipolarity of the '90s, we are currently witnessing the emergence of a multipolar international system. The European financial crisis revealed not only the feeble foundations of monetary unification but also conflict among various models of governance and financial management inside the EU.
It is particularly interesting how the latter conflict has often acquired cultural underpinnings in political and popular discourse (e.g. 'Germany versus Southern Europe'). It is equally intriguing how such cultural reductions have been enacted within an EU which is 
